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TO RESIGN OR NOT TO RESIGN
Stephen Ellmann*
I am honored to have the chance to wrestle with these issues
in conjunction with the other speakers. I will start by talking about
South Africa, and then attempt to draw somewhat broader conclu-
sions from the South African experience about the circumstances
in which judges can rightly choose to remain on the bench despite
the injustice of many or most of the laws that they apply.
As all of you know, South Africa under apartheid was a nation
of tremendous injustice. Its laws had virtually no democratic legiti-
macy. Even after the paltry constitutional reforms of the early
1980s, Africans in South Africa-almost three-quarters of the total
population of the nation-could not vote in the national elections.'
Meanwhile, the whites who controlled the South African state,
led by the National Party, took their power under the then-reigning
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy very seriously. Essentially
free to legislate as they wished, whites chose to promulgate the re-
gime of grotesque racial discrimination and oppressive security leg-
islation known as apartheid. They pressed this agenda most
intensely after the National Party took power shortly after World
War II, but they had legislated similarly, if less systematically,
throughout South Africa's history.
The result was a stunning array of remarkably detailed and
pernicious laws. Judges were absolutely bound to enforce these
provisions if they were enacted by the Parliament or faithful to
what Parliament had done. The same doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy that gave such vast legislative power to the Parliament
in the same breath took power away from the judges. South Africa
embraced this doctrine with a vengeance, notably in response to
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. I want to thank Norman Greene and Jus-
tice Priscilla Hall for guiding this panel's work, Nancy Rosenbloom for her helpful com-
ments on a draft of this essay, and New York Law School for financial support.
1 See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SouTH AFRICA? CONSTITUTIONAL EN-
GINEERING IN A DIVIDED SocIETY 48 (1991) (24 million of South Africa's estimated 1986
population of 33 million were Africans). I include, as does Horowitz, the residents of the
so-called "homelands," even though, under South African law at that time, those Africans




efforts by liberal judges in the 1950s to imply for themselves some
power of constitutional review.z
Moreover, not only were judges bound to apply elaborate and
unjust laws, but the government was also interested in cloaking the
overall system of apartheid in an aura of legitimacy that might be
conferred on the system by judges who enjoyed a reputation for
independence and integrity. Now it might be answered that
although the government wanted to gain legitimacy, no one would
ever accord it this recognition. However, the fact is-although this
does not seem to have been widely recognized while apartheid was
still a fact of life-there is substantial survey research evidence that
even black South Africans did actually accord a measure of legiti-
macy to their legal system. 4 So it is not at all implausible to say
that the efforts of anti-apartheid lawyers and anti-apartheid judges
to add a little bit of decency to this fundamentally indecent system
would have resulted in mere band-aid effects on injustice, at the
price of rather profound costs in terms of legitimation.
It would seem to follow that in South Africa, as in the painful
United States context of capital punishment, a judge with integrity
had only one option-and that was resignation. My impression is
that some South African judges did toy with this idea, and perhaps
even threatened it in private. Moreover, some extremely eminent
lawyers probably made clear that they would not accept appoint-
ment to the bench, out of political or moral conviction. During the
apartheid era, however, no one sitting on the bench ever chose to
leave it for overtly political reasons. This held true even for those
judges-and there were some-who were opposed to apartheid. It
is these anti-apartheid judges on whom I will focus, and whose de-
cisions to remain on the bench I will explain and defend, for I think
they were right not to resign.
2 For the story of these grim events, see JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 14-36 (1978).
3 I describe the government's aspirations in STEPHEN ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF
TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S STATE OF EMERGENCY 176-86 (1992).
4 See Stephen Ellmann, Law and Legitimacy in South Africa, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
407 (1995).
5 Some resignations that were not expressly motivated by political considerations may
actually have been. See John Dugard, Should Judges Resign?-A Reply to Professor
Wacks, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 286, 292 n.34 (1984) [hereinafter Dugard, Reply]. Ironically, since
the end of apartheid one South African judge has resigned for political reasons, "because
of what he saw as affirmative action's erosion of the integrity of the bench." South Africa;
SA Begins Moulding a Rechtstaat in Year of Constitution, MAIL AND GUARDIAN (JOHAN.
NESBURG), Dec. 27, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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I seek to explain why by offering you three factors that bear
on the moral calculus leading toward, or away from, resignation.
Although abstracted from the situations we have heard about from
the other panelists, I hope these factors will at least point toward
many of the considerations which have been identified by the other
speakers and thus will help us to see why in one circumstance a
judge might properly feel obliged to resign, while in another situa-
tion of even greater injustice, a judge might choose-rightly de-
cide-to remain on the bench.
The first of these criteria we can simply call "taint." The judge
who weighs whether or not to resign will surely consider how dirty
his or her hands are getting. There is a limit to how much evil
people can bear to perpetrate, or wade in, in order to do some
modest good. In some countries at some times, moreover, the
judge's hands may be getting covered with filth. For example, this
taint might well have been too great for an anti-Nazi judge in Nazi
Germany, even one who by continuing to serve on the German
bench could occasionally have saved a Jew's life by finding that this
particular Jew was not a Jew, and therefore not subject to execu-
tion for sexual relations with a non-Jewish woman. The sense of
taint would have been all the more compelling because the ration-
ale that saved this Jew might well have laid the groundwork for
condemning others who did not fit the terms of the benign decision
the judge had managed to render.
But not every unjust country relentlessly confronts its judges
with such tainted situations. In South Africa, in particular, there
were at least some occasions when benign decisions could be ren-
dered that did not carry the seeds of fresh oppression within them.
Consider the example of S v. Govender,6 a decision from 1982,
when apartheid was still very much in force. This case dealt with
the penalty to be imposed on someone convicted of violating the
infamous Group Areas Act-one of the principal legislative instru-
ments of business and residential segregation by race under
apartheid.7 Ms. Govender, a South African of Indian descent, was
convicted in a magistrate's court of living in a "White group area."
She apparently did not even attempt to appeal this conviction. In-
stead she asked the Supreme Court's Transvaal Provincial Divi-
sion-roughly the equivalent of one of our federal district courts-
6 S v. Govender, 1986 (3) SA 969 (T). Although not officially reported until 1986, the
decision was rendered in 1982.
7 For background on the Group Areas Act, see DUGARD, supra note 2, at 79-83.
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to overturn the eviction order that had been issued in conjunction
with her conviction.
The judge who wrote the decision was Richard Goldstone,
who was then a member of the Supreme Court bench.8 In the
years that followed, Judge Goldstone went on to make many other
valuable contributions to South Africa's transition to democracy
and to serve as the first chief prosecutor at the International War
Crimes Tribunal. Today, Goldstone is a member of post-apartheid
South Africa's new Constitutional Court, but in 1982 he faced, as
any other South African judge dismayed by apartheid faced, the
question of what good he could do on the bench. He could not, of
course, hold the Group Areas Act unconstitutional. However, he
could and did rule that "the practice which has grown up in these
cases" of automatically ordering eviction in tandem with conviction
should cease and "the sooner ... the better."9 For this, Goldstone
had quite clear statutory authorization, because the relevant provi-
sion, enacted in 1966, stated that the convicting court "may" order
eviction, not-as in the previous version of the Group Areas Act-
that it "shall" do so. Clear as the import of this statutory change
appeared to Judge Goldstone, though, it apparently had escaped
the attention of bench and bar for the preceding sixteen years, as
reflected in the practice of automatic eviction.
Judge Goldstone also could and did order that magistrates
considering the issuance of eviction orders make "the fullest en-
quiry" into whether such orders are appropriate. He also declared
that in doing this assessment the magistrates might need to con-
sider, among other factors, "the personal hardship which such an
order may cause and the availability of alternative accommoda-
tion."'" For this ruling, he cited no direct statutory authority, but
he pointed out the profound consequences of eviction orders and
concluded that such orders should not be issued lightly. Nothing in
the statute prohibited this line of reasoning, though nothing man-
dated it either.
If the case had done no more than this, it surely would have
been benign. In effect, however, it was even more important, be-
cause the case came to stand for a broader proposition, namely
that eviction orders could not be made unless there actually were
available alternative accommodations. The impact of this was ti-
8 The other judge on the two-judge panel, Judge Le Grange, concurred with
Goldstone.
9 Govender, 1986 (3) SA at 971.
10 Id.
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tanic, because there were very few alternative accommodations to
be had. In Johannesburg, at that time apparently, the place where
the Group Areas Act was being most frequently violated, prosecu-
tions under the Act ceased. Far from being placed in the position
of preserving one litigant by condemning others, Judge Goldstone
had rendered a decision that benefited many victims of the Group
Areas Act, and, it would seem, harmed none. This case, at least,
carried no taint."
A second consideration, already implicated in my discussion of
S v. Govender, is just how much good the judge can actually do. To
what extent can judges render decisions that do justice in the midst
of a complex of unjust laws?
Let me begin by saying that although I intend to focus primar-
ily, as I think everyone up until now has, on what judges can do
while remaining faithful to their oath of office, it ought to be recog-
nized that the oath of office is not always the highest moral obliga-
tion that a judge is under. I do not think we would criticize a judge
in Nazi Germany for having devised a way to render consciously
false verdicts that preserved the lives of persecuted Jews-for ex-
ample, by finding, untruthfully, that the Jews before him were not
Jews, and therefore were not to be executed. Doing so would have
been a breach of the judge's oath (at least unless that oath was
interpreted very vigorously), and oath-breaking is a moral wrong.
But that moral wrong would be outweighed by the moral right the
judge was doing.
The term used for this in a leading South African debate on
these issues was "judicial lying."' 2 Obviously, we are none of us
enthusiastic about such a practice. But most of us probably agree
that the conditions in Nazi Germany, and no doubt those in a
number of other oppressive regimes around the world, justified
killing to correct them. If that is right, then it is hard to say that
these conditions could never justify lying.
A more palatable form of oath-breaking is civil disobedience.
As Judge Sweet has explained, a judge who forthrightly announces
his or her refusal to apply the law in a particular case is presumably
violating the oath of office (again, unless that oath is interpreted
11 I am grateful to Geoff Budlender, a long-time anti-apartheid lawyer, for identifying
this case for me and explaining its significance.
12 See Raymond Wacks, Judges and Injustice, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 266, 278 (1984); see also
Dugard, Reply, supra note 5; Raymond Wacks, Judging Judges: A Brief Rejoinder to Pro-
fessor Dugard, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 295 (1984).
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dramatically).' 3 But the civil disobedient judge does not conceal
this conduct. Instead, like lay people who engage in comparable
activity, this judge declares if and knowingly and openly subjects
himself or herself to potential penalty. Ideally, the result is to test
the consciences of those who would impose the penalty-in the
United States, potentially, as would those members of Congress
who might have to consider the judge's impeachment. Moreover,
part of the power of the test is precisely that the person engaging in
civil disobedience is being so open and is risking so much.
Nonetheless, as I have said, my main focus is not on the justifi-
cations for deliberate departure from the law, overt or covert.
Rather, my main focus is on how much the judge can do within the
bounds of the system in which he or she is operating. Now, on that
score, South Africa, as I portrayed it to you earlier, sounds like a
place where almost nothing could be done-but it was not such a
place.
14
13 A questioner during this panel raised the issue of whether failure to follow a binding
precedent actually is an impeachable offense. Whether such conduct amounts to either a
"high crime and misdemeanor" for which any civil officer can be impeached, see U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 4, or to a breach of the arguably stricter requirement of "good behavior"
to which federal judges are subject, see id. art. III, § 1, is a question that courts apparently
have not addressed. For a concise discussion of the Constitution's standards for removal or
discipline of judges, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 64 n.7,
289 (2d ed. 1988). Moreover, it must be admitted that the oath of office taken by United
States judges says nothing specific about following precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1994).
Indeed, whether such an oath really imposes meaningful obligations has long been a matter
of debate. Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803), with Eakin v.
Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 353 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson J., dissenting).
Yet I think that we would not want to accept an understanding of the judge's oath that
permitted judges to simply reject otherwise-binding precedents when they felt the moral
stakes were so high as to justify their doing so. As this panel indicated, there are several
life-or-death issues before our courts today, including capital punishment, abortion and the
possible "right to die"; any or all of these might seem to some judges important enough to
justify rejecting precedents. Moreover, other issues could readily be added to the list that
are not life-or-death, but are arguably so integral to a good life that they too justify depar-
tures from the usual rules. If judges can ignore precedent in any one of these areas without
violating their oath, it is hard to see why they could not legitimately do so in the others as
well. At that point, it would be hard to see in what sense we had a system of judicial
hierarchy and precedent at all.
These arguments against accepting the deliberate flouting of binding precedent as con-
sistent with the judge's oath are all the more powerful because our system allows judges a
great deal of room to manipulate precedent short of absolutely flouting it. In addition, of
course, in some circumstances no precedent is absolutely binding; the Supreme Court, in
particular, is entitled to revisit its past constitutional holdings. With all of this room al-
ready for the legitimate infusion of conscience into decisionmaking, it would not be wise to
allow more.
14 I discuss the surprisingly benign aspects of South African law in much more detail in
ELLMANN, supra note 3, at 26-56.
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In fact, although South African statutory law was abysmal,
South Africa still had as part of its law common law, borrowed
largely from England but also developed in part from other
sources. This common law was strikingly different from the statu-
tory law with which it uneasily coexisted. For example, it remained
part of the common law of South Africa, in the heyday of
apartheid, that:
[I]t is the duty of the Courts to hold the scales evenly between
the different classes of the community and to declare invalid any
practice which, in the absence of the authority of an Act of Par-
liament, results in partial and unequal treatment to a substantial
degree between different sections of the community .... 15
Certainly it remained possible for Parliament to legislate
whatever it wanted, and often Parliament did not shrink from do-
ing so. Yet even legislation was not necessarily a simple way of
achieving Parliament's goals. After all, the question of whether a
statute seemingly in conflict with the common law actually over-
rides it is itself a question for the courts, and South African case
law asserted a striking reluctance to find such overriding. More-
over, even where a statute is unquestionably the source of the rele-
vant law on a subject, that statute itself must be interpreted, and
here South African judges had at their disposal a number of tools
of interpretation, some of them notably liberal, with which to ap-
proach the legislators' words. For example, a dissenting judge in
1988, after forty years of apartheid, was able to assert that "where
a statute is reasonably capable of more than one meaning, a Court
will give it the meaning which least interferes with the liberty of the
individual."' 6
Much as South Africa has gained from at last having a humane
Constitution, in a sense it can be said that one reason the law of the
old South Africa was not worse was because the nation did not
have a constitution worthy of the name.17 I say this even though
the lack of a constitution that meaningfully protected human rights
was of course a terrible problem for the victims of apartheid. But
at least South Africans seeking to make inroads against apartheid
15 R. v. Abdurahman, 1950 (3) SA 136, 145 (A).
16 Tshwete v. Minister of Home Affairs (RSA), 1988 (4) SA 586, 612 (A) (Nestadt, JA.,
dissenting) (citing R. v. Sachs, 1953 (1) SA 392, 399 (A)).
17 Apartheid South Africa did have a constitution (actually three different ones, at dif-
ferent stages of its history). Essentially, however, these constitutions were simply statutes,
amendable or repealable by Parliament at any time. Certainly none of them, as applied,




in the courts did not have to confront the authority of a revered
constitution that simultaneously protected the institutions they
sought to challenge-as American anti-slavery litigants did in the
years before the Civil War.
In short, the result in South Africa was that if you worked the
rules of the game right, you could accomplish a good deal. Some-
times important victories were won, and on other occasions less
visible but still beneficial results could be secured in part through
efforts in the courts. This is not to say that all judges did work the
rules of the game right, or with great conviction. Indeed, in the
period I have studied most closely, the state of emergency of the
late 1980s, some very important and very bad decisions were ren-
dered by what was then South Africa's highest court, the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court. But those particular decisions also
turned out to be the work of a small group of justices within the
Appellate Division whom I have elsewhere labeled the "emergency
team." For a number of years, under one particular Chief (later,
Acting Chief) Justice, these justices made up a majority of every
one of the five-justice panels that heard these cases. This stacking
of the panels was far from consistent with South Africa's own ide-
als of neutral justice, and when a new Chief Justice took office and
ended the special role of the emergency team in these cases, the
tenor of the Appellate Division's decisions improved significantly.
And even the members of the emergency team occasionally ren-
dered decisions in favor of the victims of emergency power.18
In understanding how South Africa, in the midst of apartheid,
could have been a place where anti-apartheid judges and lawyers
could make a difference, it may be helpful to further explore the
contrast I alluded to earlier, between South Africa's situation in
those years and the situation in the United States in the years
before the Civil War. Comparing two very different countries in
two very different centuries is of course a delicate business, but I
hope this comparison will be illuminating. What we need to under-
stand is why some South African judges were willing and able to
exploit the legal resources at their disposal for limiting apartheid's
injustices, whereas American judges opposed to slavery may have
been more reluctant. Whether or not the overall performance of
the South African judiciary was better than that of the American
judges, we may be able to learn from a consideration of what pro-
18 1 discuss these decisions in detail in my book, ELLMANN, supra note 3. For analysis
of the particular role played by the justices of the "emergency team," see id. at 57-69.
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moted judicial vigilance in South Africa and what undercut it in the
United States.
Professor Gates suggested in his panel presentation that those
American judges who were personally opposed to slavery failed to
render anti-slavery decisions because had they done so, they would
have had to confront issues that challenged the legitimacy of the
entire legal system. This may well be right, but I would like to
consider the situation of American judges and lawyers in the ante-
bellum years, and the somewhat different situation of South Afri-
cans under apartheid, in more prosaic terms as well.
The late Robert Cover, in his thoughtful study Justice Ac-
cused,19 examined the work of the anti-slavery judges in the ante-
bellum years, and found that whenever these judges confronted a
conflict of purely moral duties and institutional obligations, "they
almost uniformly applied the legal rules. Moreover, they seemed
very reluctant to resort to, and thus legitimate, substantial doctrinal
innovations that might have made certain cases less a choice be-
tween law and morality and more a choice between alternative
legal formulations.
' '20
Why would these judges have done less than they could have?
Perhaps, as Professor Gates suggests, they found the issues unbear-
able. But another possibility is that these issues were not necessar-
ily intrinsically unbearable, but rather (or in addition) they were
unbearably, that is to say confrontationally, litigated.2 1 Professor
Cover's account suggests two different respects in which the litiga-
tion tactics of abolitionist lawyers were indeed confrontational.
The first is doctrinal. According to Cover, even the "most com-
plete" of those "utopian" abolitionist legal arguments that claimed
fidelity to the Constitution displayed "the haphazard ingenuity of
rule and phrase manipulation ignoring the 'method' of the judge in
any real sense."' 22 This was hardly surprising, since the Constitu-
tion's protection of slavery, though euphemistic, was quite plain.
While it no doubt was possible to make many arguments in particu-
lar cases that did not rest on the utopian breach of acceptable legal
method, this weakness at the foundation, in the Constitution itself,
may have undercut the persuasive force of even more modest
assertions.
19 ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975).
20 Id. at 199.
21 I explore these possibilities at greater length in ELLMANN, supra note 3, at 232-44.
22 COVER, supra note 19, at 156-57.
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The second confrontational aspect of antebellum litigation was
the stance of the abolitionist lawyers towards the judges. As Cover
writes, "[i]t is one thing to be begged to act in a particular way by
appeal to the presumed magnanimity of the man and the institu-
tion, quite another to be threatened with scorn and damnation for
being a gutless sycophant. ' 23 Even in court, the efforts of the "ide-
ological bar" sometimes "seemed to have no basis except the hope
of a stroke of the lawless mob effecting a rescue."'24
Surely, if you were a judge considering what to do, and you
were presented with arguments that did not hold water in the terms
that you accepted, and arguments made by people whose motiva-
tions you began to consider deeply suspect, you would not likely
be persuaded! And all of this is in quite sharp contrast to what I
take to have been the pattern of South African anti-apartheid liti-
gation. I do not want to suggest that there were no signs of judicial
suspicion directed towards anti-apartheid lawyers, or that those
lawyers never stretched their arguments and never severely criti-
cized the judges. I do think, however, that the fact that South Afri-
can lawyers were able to develop their legal arguments, however
extreme, without confronting the moral authority of a hostile con-
stitution, and the fact that in general these lawyers apparently
chose to present those arguments in court in the comparatively def-
erential style customary in the South African courts, increased
their chances of victory.
In saying that the judge who must decide whether to resign
will consider how much he or she can accomplish by staying on the
bench, therefore, we should not think of the judge's decision as an
abstract one. What the judge believes can be accomplished will
depend in part on the legal resources available to him or her. It
will also depend on the way that the bar develops and presents
those legal resources to the judge.
But neither laws nor lawyers nor judges exist outside of soci-
ety. It is important to understand that the judge's, or the lawyer's,
assessment of what good can be done will surely be affected by an
assessment of what is happening elsewhere in the society. In South
Africa, it turned out that change could be achieved without a full-
scale, violent revolution; perhaps, indeed, apartheid could only
have been ended in the foreseeable future through negotiation.
Judges may have seen this; as change began to accelerate, some
may have taken a lead from the political leaders of the country. In
23 Id. at 212.
24 Id.
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the United States, on the other hand, it may be that slavery would
not have ended in the 1860s, or for decades thereafter, without the
Civil War. In that case, the abolitionists' legal tactics, though they
may have been ill-suited to winning courtroom victories, may have
been well aimed at producing the polarization of opinion and feel-
ing that would be required to bring the country to a grim, but mor-
ally necessary, Civil War.
The judge's calculus, however, is not yet complete. Besides
weighing the personal taint involved in remaining on the bench,
and the social good to be done by staying there, the judge should
also consider what social harm he or she might do in the process.
There are various ways that good judges might actually cause harm.
For example, their presence on the bench might encourage victims
of injustice to seek judicial solutions rather than political mobiliza-
tion, and that choice might be a great mistake. Perhaps most
troublesome, good judges might actually undercut opposition to in-
justice by lending a veneer of legitimacy to a fundamentally unjust
enterprise. I think we heard this concern when Judge Utter ex-
pressed his belief that even in dissenting, he was still lending sup-
port to the notion that the death penalty could be made workable.
The possibility of such legitimation deserves to be taken very
seriously. Determining when it actually does occur, however, is not
easy.25 My own sense is that this kind of legitimation is by no
means inevitable. This, I believe, is the lesson of South Africa's
experience on this score. Happily, in saying this I have the benefit
of hindsight, as we all do in looking back at the system of
apartheid. From this vantage point it seems quite clear that, how-
ever much the government hoped for some broad legitimation-
through-law to take place, it did not. As one anti-apartheid lawyer,
now a judge, emphasized to me, no court decision stopped the
flood of opposition to apartheid. Most black South Africans surely
disliked apartheid, and no amount of litigation-especially anti-
apartheid litigation in which very nasty things were being said
about apartheid along the way-was going to cause them to think:
"My goodness, we have a court system so benign that actually the
whole system must be okay after all." It just was not going to
happen.26
What may well have happened, however, is that the efforts of
anti-apartheid lawyers and judges in South Africa did help to legiti-
25 See generally Symposium, Lawyering in Repressive States, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 339
(1995).
26 See ELLMANN, supra note 3, at 257-68.
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mize one aspect of this system-namely the legal system itself. As
I have mentioned, the legal system does appear to have enjoyed a
surprising degree of legitimacy in the minds of black South Afri-
cans. Moreover, the efforts of anti-apartheid lawyers and judges
may in a number of ways have lent a measure of credibility to the
operations and the aspirations of the South African legal system,
by winning modest-but not negligible-victories for ordinary
people on such prosaic matters as pension benefits or similar
problems, by providing a forum for apartheid's victims to speak
and be heard, and even by achieving what may have been quite a
surprising degree of success in political trials, which lent a measure
of credibility to the system.
At one time, some might have counted this degree of legitima-
tion of the legal system as a cost. But even before the end of
apartheid, before the end of any system of injustice, we should al-
ways keep in mind the question of what will come next. Moreover,
we should be aware that the answer will always be, at best, that
what will follow will be another human, imperfect social system.
The new regime may be better, or it may be worse, but it will surely
need a legal system and a people who adhere to legal ideals. As a
result, we always know that it is important for those who hope to
bring about the new regime to try to act in a way that fosters a
better future, rather than a worse one.
The work of anti-apartheid lawyers and judges may be having
such a benign effect, for the degree of legitimation that the South
African legal system may have earned from their efforts may now
be contributing to the institutionalization of a democratic rule of
law in post-apartheid South Africa. When I spoke on these matters
at this panel in June 1996, South Africa's Constitutional Assembly
had recently finished drafting a final Constitution. But that Consti-
tution did not automatically take effect, regardless of its contents.
Instead, in a step apparently unprecedented in the world's develop-
ment of constitutional order, South Africa had previously decided
that its Constitutional Court would have the authority to say
whether the draft constitution complied with a set of constitutional
principles that had been agreed on as part of the interim Constitu-
tion that was the country's first post-apartheid framework of gov-
ernment. 8 Nor was this grant of power to the Constitutional Court
27 I develop these and other possibilities in Ellmann, supra note 4, in particular at 471-
73.
28 See CoNsT. OF S. AFR. § 71 (1993 as amended) (on the role of the Constitutional
Court); id. sched. 4 (Constitutional Principles).
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pro forma. In fact, the Constitutional Court refused to certify the
draft Constitution as complying with those principles,2 9 and it was
only after further revisions by the Constitutional Assembly that the
Court was ultimately satisfied.3 ° South Africa's new Constitution,
surely a testament to the power of legal institutions and ideals as
well as to the determination of South Africa's people to overcome
injustice, is now in effect.31
The three factors I have discussed-the taint, the benefit, and
the cost of remaining on the bench-do not exhaust the issues the
judge confronting legal injustice will need to consider. Even while
such a judge weighs the impact of remaining on the bench, he or
she will also have to assess what the symbolic and practical results
of resignation may be. Evaluating the efficacy of resignation is a
complex matter in its own right.3 But I hope this brief discussion
has helped to explain why judges in truly unjust states might rightly
conclude that they should continue to serve, even as other judges
confronting a different moral calculus might rightly leave the bench
of a democratic nation that aspires to justice.
29 See Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC).
30 See Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the
Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1997 (2) SA 97
(CC).
31 See CONST. OF S. AFR. (1996). The new Constitution went into effect as a whole at
midnight on Monday, February 3, 1997. See New Constitution Comes into Effect, Marks
End of Transition, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, CURNWS File.
32 But cf. CoNST. OF S. AFR. § 243 (1996) (authorizing President to put parts of the
Constitution into effect earlier than the Constitution as a whole, and providing that speci-
fied provisions do not come into effect until Jan. 1, 1998). In South Africa, the eminent
anti-apartheid scholar John Dugard argued emphatically that isolated resignations would
be meaningless, and that the possibility of more than a handful of resignations taking place
was "fanciful." Dugard, Reply, supra note 5, at 292.
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